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ABSTRACT 
Three of the most iconic rulers of Afghanistan are Ahmad Khan Durrani, Abdur Rahman, 
and Mohammad Zahir Shah.  The efforts of Ahmad Khan Durrani and Abdur Rahman 
were focused on building an Afghan nation and development of a central government 
authority that possessed some capacity to rule over the Afghan territories.  Neither ruler 
sought to politically include the Afghan population in the affairs of the state beyond the 
cooperation of the tribal leaders who possessed the ability to commit or withdraw the 
manpower and resources of their tribes, which were necessary to militarily sustain their 
respective regimes.  It was not until the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah that central 
government in Afghanistan attempted to politically include the Afghan population in 
state affairs.  However, this was only accomplished on a limited basis.  The international 
community and President Hamid Karzai have been attempting to implement 220 years of 
nation-building and central governance development in Afghanistan over the past nine 
years.  If successful, these efforts would create a government and a state that has never 
before existed in Afghanistan’s history.  This thesis argues that current efforts should be 
informed and mindful of the experiences of these three iconic rulers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the dynamics of the historical relationship between central 
governance and the tribal systems of Afghanistan.  This examination will be used to 
synthesize an analysis of how the central government presently being established by 
President Hamid Karzai, with the assistance of the international community, particularly 
the United States, compares to past attempts of centralized governance in Afghanistan.  It 
is my preliminary hypothesis that even though there have been historical improvements 
in the quality of life for the people of Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban from 
power in 2001, these improvements have been mainly due to the presence and individual 
efforts of international forces assisting with the reconstruction of Afghan governance at 
both the local and central government levels.  The system of centralized governance 
being established by the Karzai regime does not appear to be radically different from 
systems of centralized governance that have existed in Afghanistan’s past.  Conducting a 
comparative historical analysis of how the more iconic rulers of Afghanistan and their 
associated systems of central authority administered governance and comparing them to 
the system of central governance that is being established by President Karzai and his 
regime may assist in defining specific political and security conditions that would permit 
the phased withdrawal of U.S. and international military forces from Afghanistan.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
Over the past nine years, the international community has been assisting the 
people of Afghanistan to rebuild their country and combat Taliban violence.  This task 
has been challenging to say the least.  The Bonn Agreement signed in December 2001 
provided a basic theoretical roadmap for how central governance in Afghanistan could be 
rebuilt.  In sum, this roadmap promoted the establishment of a democratic system of 
governance with Afghan nuances.  Interestingly, this theoretical roadmap was not 
necessarily proposed because democratic government was an appropriate system of 
governance for Afghanistan based its historical experience with central governance.  It 
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was chosen because democratic government is the only template to implement that the 
United Nations possesses in its bag of nation building.  This template of democratic 
government is also the most familiar system of governance with which the 
representatives of the United States assisting with the rebuilding of Afghan governance 
are familiar.  The signing of the Bonn Agreement provided the political leaders of the 
international community with hopes and dreams that democratic governance in 
Afghanistan was an achievable endeavor.  However, accusations of governmental 
corruption, the continued prevalence of violent acts associated with the Taliban, and the 
increasing presence of international military forces in Afghanistan is beginning to 
generate dialogue aimed towards reevaluating what elements of good governance can 
realistically be achieved in Afghanistan with the assistance of the international 
community.   
Both the international community and the Afghan people do not want Afghanistan 
to return under Taliban rule.1  From the perspective of the United States and the 
international community, Taliban control of Afghanistan equates to terrorist 
organizations once again being allowed to use its territories to train followers and launch 
terrorist attacks against those communities that do not share their ideologies, particularly 
the United States.  From the perspective of the Afghan people, Taliban control of 
Afghanistan would result in a return to an intolerable existence of draconian rule.  
Neither circumstance is a desirable end state for both the international community and the 
Afghan people.  These two circumstances are the conditions that the international 
community and people of Afghanistan would agree define the lower bound of what can 
be achieved in Afghanistan.  Security, stability, and long lasting peace under democratic 
governance defines the upper bound of the conditions that would permit the withdrawal 
international military forces from Afghanistan.  Determining what conditions can be 
realistically achieved that would permit the withdrawal of international military forces 
from Afghanistan is vital to both the international community and the Afghan people.   
                                                 
1 Richard N. Haass, “We’re Not Winning. It’s Not Worth It. Here’s How to Draw Down in 
Afghanistan,” Newsweek, July 26, 2010, 33–34. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Historically, Afghanistan has never experienced rule under a strong system of 
centralized government that was able to extend governance over all territories within the 
country’s internationally recognized borders.  At most, Afghan central governance has 
only been able to effectively apply governance within the boundaries of the country’s 
urban areas, particularly Kabul.  In the past, the rural areas of Afghanistan have 
traditionally been under the control of tribal systems of governance.  Typically, tribal 
leaders were permitted to autonomously rule over their respective territories with 
minimal intrusion so long as they agreed not to challenge the central government. 2   Even 
though this type of cooperative relationship may seem inefficient and systematically 
problematic from the perspective of Western democratic expertise, it is a familiar system 
of centralized governance that seems to have an established record of being able to 
provide a degree of normalcy to the Afghan people.  This is not to suggest that the 
Afghan people did not harbor any objections to the central government systems of past 
times.  
At present, the United Nations, with the United States as lead, and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) are working together to 
establish a system of centralized democratic government in Afghanistan.  However, 
allegations of corruption at multiple levels of President Karzai’s regime seem to suggest 
that establishment of a system of democratic governance as envisioned by the Bonn 
Agreement is in actuality merely providing opportunistic governmental personalities with 
an alternative means to exploit the Afghan population instead of providing stability, 
security, and good governance.  This is one of the drawbacks that governments 
transitioning to democracy are highly susceptible.  Many seem to forget the hundreds of 
years that it has taken Western democracies, particularly the United States, to establish a 
functional and accountable democratic system of governance.  Rather than introducing 
and implementing yet another completely foreign system of governance in Afghanistan, it 
may be useful to gain familiarity with the strengths of the systems of centralized 
governance that have been able to maintain a relatively normal, familiar, and 
                                                 
2 Jeffery J. Robertson, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport: Praeger, 2003), XII. 
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comparatively stable existence for the people of Afghanistan.  Understanding the role that 
central governance has played throughout the history of Afghanistan seems key to 
understanding what can be realistically achieved by the combined effort of the GIROA 
and the international community.  Determining what can be realistically achieved in 
Afghanistan by the GIROA with the assistance of the international community may help 
provide better direction to those that are advising with the reconstruction of Afghanistan 
so that the people of Afghanistan at both the local and state level can become empowered 
with the capacity to better determine their own destiny.  This in turn would facilitate the 
more timely withdrawal of international military forces and resources from the country, 
an objective that is becoming increasingly important to both the countries contributing 
military forces as well as the Afghan people.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is a preliminary survey of various publications that will be 
consulted to formulate this thesis.  As one becomes more familiar with the nuances and 
dynamics of Afghanistan’s historical experiences with various forms of central 
governance, the “top down phenomena” of Western European state-building that many 
have used to analyze nation-building in Afghanistan becomes less applicable.  The 
Afghan nation-building experience is unique.   
Francis Fukuyama’s State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century provides an overview of the conditions of governance in Afghanistan.  
According to Fukuyama, “Afghanistan never had a modern state” and has never met the 
definition of a nation-state.  From 1748–1973, Afghanistan never actually developed 
beyond a “tribal confederation” since the monarchy was never able to extend direct state 
administration and control beyond the capital in Kabul.3  Ever since the removal of the 
Taliban from power in 2001, state building in Afghanistan has begun from the ground up.  
According to Fukuyama “the subsequent years of communist misrule and civil war 
eliminated everything that was left of that already weak state.”  The political elites of 
                                                 
3 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 101. 
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Afghanistan have exclusively relied on guidance and resources of foreign donors to 
rebuild the institutional bureaucracies and administrative capabilities of Afghanistan’s 
central government.  Presently, the United Nations and the United States are the foreign 
donors contributing resources and providing guidance to the GIROA using models of 
democratic governance.   
Democratic governance is not necessarily being advocated and implemented in 
Afghanistan because it is the most appropriate system of governance.  It is the most 
familiar form of governance to those who are advising the GIROA.  According to 
Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, the people of Afghanistan are once again having to adopt yet 
another model of governance and nation-building that is alien to Afghan rulers and their 
society, values, and traditions.4  Given the growing literature on democratization and 
state-making, the installation of democratic governance by the United Nations and the 
United States is adding additional complication to an already complex society that is 
unfamiliar and misunderstood by Western civilization.5  Even more importantly, the 
qualitative analysis of regime transition and democratization conducted by Edward 
Mansfield and Jack Snyder must be taken into heavy consideration since their analysis 
concludes that the very process of democratization increases a nation’s likelihood to go to 
war.6  
In Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Olivier Roy provides detailed discussion 
of the tendency to resist strong central governance that has persisted throughout 
Afghanistan’s history.  Establishment of a strong, all-inclusive system of central 
governance has never been fully support by the people of Afghanistan.  This should not 
be surprising since no form of central government through the history of Afghanistan has 
been able to garner long-lasting support from the population.  Throughout the history of 
Afghanistan, central governance has made numerous attempts and utilized multiple 
                                                 
4 Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek. “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism, and 
Their Discontents.” In Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: The Struggle for the Afghan 
State, edited by Willem Van Schendel and Erik J. Zurcher. (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2001), 149. 
5 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 101. 
6 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs, 75, No. 3 
(1995): 79–97. 
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methods to gain access to local structures of governance.  Each attempt has been met with 
increased resistance and eventual revolt.  This cycle has repeated itself over many 
different Afghan regimes using varying models of government.  In a state like 
Afghanistan, when the government tries to establish legal and political control throughout 
a given area, the process requires turning tribes into taxpaying peasants.  This 
relationship represented a direct challenge by the central authority to the tribal structure 
and a direct attack on social and economic hierarchies that have existed in Afghanistan 
for centuries.7 
Olivier Roy, Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, Barnett R. Rubin, and Jeffery J. 
Robertson collectively provide specifics of how central governance was perceived by the 
rural societies of Afghanistan.  Afghanistan is composed of traditional communitarian, 
nomadic, and tribal societies where social organization and identification may be based 
upon multiple ethno linguistic, tribal, regional, religious, socio-religious, or social 
divisions.8  Most tribes and villages have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, 
accepting central control only when it was in their material interest or when faced with 
overwhelming force.9  The recent history of Afghanistan is one filled with revolt against 
the central power and of resistance to the penetration of the countryside by the state 
bureaucracy.10  The tribes of Afghanistan have historically perceived central government 
as a foreign and unfamiliar power trying to take control in areas of society that 
traditionally have been governed by tribal codes and laws.  For the average Afghan, 
national politics has been of little concern.  However the majority of Afghans have 
consistently been concerned with keeping the state’s influence at the local (village, tribe, 
etc.) levels as low as possible and securing the power balance that has developed over the 
last few decades between the state and local socio-political entities.11  This deep distrust 
                                                 
7 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
15. 
8 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. (New York: New York University 
Press, 2005), 18. 
9 Jeffery J. Robertson, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan. XII. 
10 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 10. 
11 Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, Nationalism, and 
Their Discontents,” 151.  
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of any central authority has been a great impediment to all central government attempts to 
create any genuine social and political change thought would bring about democratic 
development.  Resistance to the central government has occurred at local levels and from 
different segments of society that are poised to lose their power with the creation of an 
all-inclusive central government.  For these reasons, historically, Afghan rulers have 
failed in their attempts to create a strong, independent, and central state nor have they 
been able to attain the resources to accomplish such a task while in power.12  The 
autonomous solidarity groups within Afghanistan have prevented the creation of a 
western defined Afghan nation-state.  However, Afghanistan has been able to sustain a 
loose confederation of ethnic and tribal groups within a shared internationally demarcated 
border.   
Asta Olesen provides some detailed explanation of how central governance in 
Afghanistan was able to establish a system of cooperation with the tribal leaderships.  
Despite its inherent instability, the tribes and state in Afghanistan have been able to 
maintain a single system.13  The Pashtun tribes were the military and political backbone 
of the Afghan kingdom with political elites primarily composed of Durrani Pashtuns.  In 
1747, the confederacy of Pashtun tribes elected Ahmad Khan Durrani as Shah of 
territorial Afghanistan.  Ahmad Khan Durrani was titled the monarch, but was regarded 
by the tribes as more of a “superior chief” who was subject to the same limitations of 
other Pashtun tribal chieftans.  He was expected to consult with the nine tribal Pashtun 
chieftans on state matters to ensure their cooperation.14  The state was rather limited in 
scope, primarily consisting of the internal administration of justice, provision of military 
protection against external aggression, and revenue collection to finance these functions.  
The internal administration of law was mainly based on Sharia (Islamic law) 
incorporated with elements of Pashtunwali and customary law (called rawaj).  Judicial 
officials called qazis appointed by the Shah administered institutional rule of law in the 
                                                 
12 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
15.  
13 R. Tapper 1983, 4: The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, cited by Asta Olesen in 
Islam and Politics in Afghanistan. (Chippenham: Curzon Press, 1995), 29. 
14 Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan. (Chippenham: Curzon Press, 1995), 29. 
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urban areas.  However, qazis often only interjected in civil matters.  Tribal councils 
called jirgas addressed criminal matters.  Jirgas also maintained rule of law in the rural 
countryside.15  
The various tribes residing within the internationally recognized territorial 
boundaries of Afghanistan provided troops and funding to resource the national military.  
According to Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani, “the western regions gave him warriors; the 
eastern regions gave him money.”16  Durrani Pashtun clans contributed troops in 
exchange for rent-free land grants from the Shah.  These troop contributions primarily 
held the officer ranks.  A similar strategy was employed to obtain troop contributions 
from the non-Pashtun tribes.  Non-Pashtuns made up the majority of the subordinate 
ranks.  All clans were expected to augment the national military with their militias in case 
of foreign invasion.  At first, the principal income for the state came from revenues from 
land and produce, much of which was territory that later ceded to British India.  Once the 
British seceded the India territories, the revenue lost was compensated through British 
subsidies in exchange for their cooperation and that of the regional tribes.17   
Thomas Barfield also provides analysis of the cooperation that existed between 
the tribal societies of Afghanistan’s rural territories and central government.  He also 
attempts to identify conditions that sustained the cooperation between tribal and state 
leaderships that have existed throughout the history of Afghanistan and in order to 
determine if similar conditions are present within the Karzai regime.  Barfield describes 
the Durrani Pashtuns as “professional rulers” that abandoned the democratic and federal 
political institutions commonly used among the Pashtun tribes at the local level, and 
replaced them with autocracy in order to maintain political power of the state exclusively 
 
 
                                                 
15 Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Chippenham: Curzon Press, 1995), 31. 
16 Ibid., 32. 
17 Ibid. 
 9
within their own dynastic lines.18  Tribal groups were content to remain distant from the 
dynastic struggles of the Durrani Pashtuns so long as any victor continued to respect their 
traditional rights or pay them off.19  
Despite the discontent for central government discussed Roy, Robertson, and 
Rasuly-Paleczek, Barfield has identified reasons why Afghan regional leadership found it 
important to maintain a central government rather than pursuing a divided state.  Since 
the mid 19th century, the Afghan central government had relied on foreign subsidies, 
largely from the British based on their own strategic territorial goals with respect to 
Russia, to help them finance their governments, equip their armies, and build 
infrastructure without taxing their own people.20  Afghan factions understood that the 
existence of an Afghan central government allowed them to more effectively tap info the 
resources of the international community since the outside world only had to deal with a 
single institution instead of each individual faction.21  Even though each faction was 
divided into distinct regional and ethnic groups that could conceivably live without each 
other’s company, there has been little pressure to break the country up into smaller parts.  
Maintaining Afghanistan as a single state was advantageous because a larger state served 
as a barrier against regional neighbors meddling in Afghan affairs.22  Afghan regional 
leaders recognized that if Afghanistan were broken into smaller pieces, Afghan territories 
could potentially be more easily dominated or attacked by their neighbors.  The presence 
of a central Afghan government permitted continued associations between Afghan 
regions and neighboring states while maintaining external meddling within tolerable 
bounds.23 
Barfield acknowledges the general conclusion produced by Western models of 
nation building that Afghanistan is a failed state.  However, Barfield does contend that 
Afghanistan is not a failed nation. A strong sense of national unity “forged during the 
                                                 
18 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 4. 
19 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 5. 
20 Ibid., 315. 
21 Ibid, 280. 
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 Ibid., 279. 
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Soviet war as well as the refugee experiences in neighboring Pakistan and Iran” does 
exist.  An ideology of Afghan nationalism is rooted in the will of the Afghan people to 
persist together, particularly during times of occupation by unwanted foreign invaders.  
The will to persist together seems to have transcended ethnic and regional differences. 
Understanding that all Afghan factions wished to hold the country together, and not 
divide it along ethnic lines into even thinner parts, is an underappreciated Afghan 
strength that would allow its leaders to rebuild a central government through a process of 
consensus.24   
The international community’s efforts to rebuild central governance in 
Afghanistan seems to have failed to recognize that historically for the Afghan people, a 
government’s function is more important than its form.  Ordinary Afghans desire 
security, economic stability, and a chance to live normal lives.25  The international 
community focuses on the primacy of processes and institutions whereas the Afghan 
people have focused their attention on quality of leadership and actions.26  The traditional 
Afghan template for legitimizing leadership has been based upon actions rather than the 
processes (such as elections) that created it.27  President Hamid Karzai has yet to validate 
his legitimacy to the Afghan people through his actions.  In the eyes of the Afghan 
people, President Karzai has yet to prove that he can live up to the role he now fills and 
provide the people with what they expect: security, economic improvement, and a 
functioning government.  Electoral victories mean nothing to the Afghan people if he 
fails to do so.28 
Nation building is a complicated endeavor for any civilization to undertake.  The 
challenges involved are numerous, requiring great patience and perseverance to work 
through and solve.  The processes of nation building are of particular interest today due to 
the involvement of the United States and the international community in the rebuilding 
and reconstruction of the Afghan state.  The scholars that have contributed to Francis 
                                                 
24 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 277–278. 
25 Ibid, 8. 
26 Ibid, 305–306. 
27 Ibid., 302. 
28 Ibid., 301. 
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Fukuyama’s Nation-Building: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan appear to possess logical and 
relatively similar views on what requisite elements of statehood must be established in 
order to systematically rebuild the state of Afghanistan.  According to Marvin 
Weinbaum, one of the contributing authors in Nation-Building: Beyond Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the requisites for rebuilding include: 
 The provision of functioning state institutions 
 Invigorated economy 
 Sustained foreign assistance 
 The resolution, or at least management, of outstanding, divisive political 
and constitutional issues 
 Reviving and strengthening of constructive national myths 
 State building may falter without reasonably capable, legitimate, and 
visionary leaders.29 
There is much evidence to support the claim that the international community has 
made relatively tremendous progress in assisting the people of Afghanistan with either 
assisting with or achieving the first four requisites of Weinbaum’s nation-building list.  
However, the international community cannot necessarily assist with achieving the fifth 
and sixth requisites.  With respect to the fifth requisite, the international community does 
not necessarily possess the familiarity with Afghanistan’s historical experiences to 
effectively provide assistance.   
The sixth requisite of Weinbaum’s nation-building list is of particular interest and 
will be focused on within this analysis of the Afghan central government.  According to 
Weinbaum, “leadership is essential to providing purpose and direction for an Afghanistan 
emerging from its long national trauma.”30  On a more basic level, what Weinbaum 
seems to be suggesting is that even if first through fifth requisites are accomplished, state 
building or nation building will still require the individual efforts and actions of people, 
and in this particular case, the people of Afghanistan, to succeed.  Nation building in 
Afghanistan is not unique to the twenty-first century.  Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani, the 
                                                 
29 Marvin B. Weinbaum, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Impediments, Lessons, and Prospects.” In Nation-
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Edited by Francis Fukuyama, 125–144. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 126–128. 
30 Marvin B. Weinbaum, “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Impediments, Lessons, and Prospects,” 126–128. 
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Father of the Afghan nation, Amir Abdur Rahman, “The Iron Amir”, and King 
Mohammad Zahir Shah were rulers of the Afghan nation that engaged in a form of 
nation-building during their respective periods of reign.  The nation-building efforts of 
these three rulers were largely focused on the establishment and sustainment of central 
governance authority.  The following chapters will discuss how Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, and King Mohammad Zahir Shah established and 
sustained central governance in Afghanistan during their respective periods of reign.  The 
nation-building endeavors of these three rulers will reveal the relevance of the sixth 
requisite of Weinbaum’s nation-building list within Afghanistan’s historical context.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES/ THESIS OVERVIEW 
This historical comparison of the structural dynamics between Afghanistan’s 
tribal societies and central government will be conducted using peer reviewed scholarship 
primarily published by academic university presses and independent research 
organizations such as The Brookings Institution.  The regimes of Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, (July 1747–October 1772), Abdur Rahman, a.k.a. “The Iron Amir” (May 1880–
October 1901), and Mohammed Zahir Shah (November 1933–July 1973), will form the 
basis of this historical comparison.  In the opinion of this author, some of the more 
historically relevant Afghan experiences with central governance are associated with the 
reigns of these three rulers, and will be used to formulate a discussion of the current 
circumstances of central governance that presently exist in Afghanistan today.  The 
regime of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani was selected, since this monarch is known as the 
father of the Afghan nation.  The regime of Abdur Rahman Khan was selected because of 
his ability to consolidate central government authority, create institutionalized central 
government authority, and his application of mechanisms that were able to pacify tribal 
resistance.  The reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah was selected because of his efforts to 
incorporate liberalized governance to Afghanistan.  It is my belief that a comparative 
analysis of these three regimes can shed some insight and understanding of the aspects of 
central government that have been able to establish cooperative relationships between the 
tribal leaderships and central governments of Afghanistan in order to establish and 
sustain a degree of stability throughout the history of the country.  The findings of this 
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comparative case study will then be used to determine if President Hamid Karzai is 
pursuing similar avenues of governance.  I suspect that this comparison will reveal that 
President Karzai and his regime are not pursuing the establishment of a progressive 
system of democratic governance with the assistance of the international community. 
Since the events of Afghanistan continue to unfold, journal articles, press releases, and 
Internet sources will be used to form the basis of the analysis of the Karzai regime.  
Internet sources, such as the Afghan Research Unit, will be referenced to develop an 
analysis of the prevailing public opinion of the Afghan population towards President 
Karzai and his regime.  Given the limited amount of time available to complete this 
project, travelling to Afghanistan to develop a firsthand experience and evaluation of the 
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II. SHAH AHMAD KHAN DURRANI (1747–1772) 
Leadership is essential to providing purpose and direction for an 
Afghanistan emerging from its long national trauma.31 
The Afghan experience with central governance begins with the reign of Shah 
Ahmad Khan Durrani.  As previously mentioned, Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani has been 
identified as the father of the Afghan nation, possessing a personal valor and political 
insight that Afghans of the time identified as the characteristic qualities of successful 
leadership.32  The purpose of this section is to discuss how the monarch (or Shah) was 
able to develop and sustain central governance rule in Afghanistan during his reign.  It is 
the author’s preliminary hypothesis that Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani was able to sustain 
his rule of Afghanistan by reinforcing the strength of an army loyal to him while 
simultaneously establishing a system of patronage between the monarchy and the 
leadership of the Afghan tribal communities.  Although the Shah may have ultimately 
wanted to be able to have central government authority over all territories of Afghanistan, 
it is evident that he understood that such an objective was unrealistic.  The more 
achievable and realistic objective of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani was to sustain the 
monarchy through the cooperation of the Afghan tribes while simultaneously maintaining 
a level of independence from their influence.  This system of cooperation between the 
central government and the tribal leaderships provided Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani with 
the necessary resources to sustain the monarchy while still preserving the relative 
autonomy of the Afghan tribes.   
A. ASCENSION TO POWER 
Afghanistan did not begin as a typical nation state with definite boundaries.  After 
centuries of fragmentation and rule by invaders, Shah Ahmad Khan Durrrani shaped 
Afghanistan into a confederation of loosely unified tribes and khanates composed of 
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ethnic groups possessing common customs, traditions, language, and ancestry.33  This 
Afghan empire extended from the Central Asia to Delhi, and from Kashmir to the 
Arabian Sea.  Even though some scholars of Afghanistan have described Shah Ahmad 
Khan Durrani as “rising to greatness in the tradition of Afghan warrior poets, a 
charismatic leader who fused but left fission in his wake,” he did not ascend to the 
position of the monarch of Afghanistan solely on his personal merits.34  His abilities as a 
military and political leader were most likely a product of his position within the regime 
of Nadir Shah Afshar, the Shah of Persia who had ruled the Afghan territories under the 
Persian Empire from 1736–1747.  At the time Ahmad Khan Durrani was the leader of the 
Abdalis, the elite corps of Nadir Shah Afshar’s army.  In 1747, after the death of Nadir 
Shah Afshar, Ahmad Khan Durrani was able to terminate ties with the Persian Empire 
and declare the independence of the Afghan territories.35  Even though Ahmad Khan 
Durrani still possessed access to part of Nadir Shah Afshar’s treasury, in addition to 
approximately 4,000 veteran cavalrymen, these monetary and military resources alone 
were not necessarily sufficient to force the cooperation of the relatively autonomous 
Afghan tribes, particularly the Durrani Pashtuns, for the Afghan monarchy.36  The 
Pashtun tribes have historically formed the military and political backbone of the Afghan 
empire.37  Of all the Pashtuns clans, the Durrani Pashtuns of the time represented the 
militarily strongest and the most economically prosperous segment of the Afghan 
population between the urban areas of Herat and Qandahar.38 
The appointment of Ahmad Khan Durrani as the Shah was based upon tribal 
affiliations, traditions, and processes and that the sardars (tribal leaders) of the Durrani 
Pashtuns believed could be exploited in order to limit the capacity of the position to serve 
their own interests.  Selection of Ahmad Khan Durrani as the Shah of Afghanistan by the 
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leadership of the Pashtun tribes was largely based on his tribal and clan affiliation.  
Ahmad Khan Durrani was a member of the Sadozai clan, an offshoot of the Popalzai clan 
of the Durrani Pashtuns.  The Sadozai clan was smaller and comparatively less influential 
than other Durrani Pashtun clans.  The Durrani Pashtun sardars presumed that since 
Ahmad Khan Durrani belonged to a relatively weaker Pashtun clan, they could remove 
him from power if he did not act in their interests.39  According to author Asta Olesen, 
the position of the Shah was traditionally viewed as that of a superior chief amongst the 
Durrani Pashtun sardars. Based on this perception, the individual selected to the position 
of the Shah was most likely subject to the same limitations defined by the traditional 
tribal structural systems that were imposed on the sardars.40  A council of nine Durrani 
Pashtun sardars appointed Ahmad Khan Durrani to the position of Shah. This process 
effectively bound the Shah to the will of the Durrani Pashtun sardars since his ability to 
rule depended upon their cooperation since each sardar possessed the authority to either 
commit or withhold the support and resources of their respective clans.41  This 
relationship of dependency made it mandatory for Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani to consult 
the council of nine Durrani Pashtun sardars on all major issues in order to obtain their 
cooperation, thereby limiting the Shah’s freedom of action despite his position as the 
ruler of Afghanistan.42  This relationship of dependency between the ruler of Afghanistan 
and the tribal leaders created a dilemma that would face Ahmad Khan Durrani’s 
successors for many years to come.43 
B. BALANCING INDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION 
Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani’s service to Nadir Shah Afshar most likely influenced 
him to conclude that the Afghan nation required the formation of a centralized monarchy 
based on the Persian model.  Since the military and monetary resources that Shah Ahmad 
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Khan Durrani possessed at the beginning of his reign were small and limited in 
comparison to the resources of the Durrani Pashtun tribes, he required their cooperation 
to sustain his reign.  However, in order to establish a centralized monarchy capable of 
asserting authority over the tribes, the Shah would have to gain a degree of independence 
from them while still obtaining their cooperation.44  Author Vartan Gregorian writes that 
the Ahmad Khan Durrani was astute enough to recognize that the individualism of the 
tribes was too strong to truly permit the assertion of central authority over them.45  Shah 
Ahmad Khan Durrani attempted to break the monarchy’s dependence on the tribes by 
building an army that possessed loyalties to him.  Since the manpower and monetary 
resources for the monarchy’s army had to come from the tribes, the continued 
cooperation of the tribal leaderships for the Shah was obtained through the granting of 
land allotments as well as the their preferential appointment to state offices responsible 
for managing conscription of soldiers from the tribal populations and the collection of 
taxes. 
C. THE ARMY OF THE MONARCHY 
Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani began to sever, but only to a limited extent, the 
dependence of the monarchy on the support and cooperation of the tribes through the 
establishment and formation of an army.  The Shah believed that an army loyal to the 
monarchy, regardless of the ethnicities of the soldiers from which its members originated, 
was the true body politic.46  Building an army that possessed strength and numbers that 
could rival, but not necessarily surpass, the strength and numbers of the Durrani Pashtun 
militias would allow the monarchy to gain some independence from tribes without 
necessarily threatening their autonomy.  Thus, Ahmad Khan Durrani’s main objective 
early on in his reign was the creation of a standing army that possessed loyalties to the 
monarchy.  At his ascension to power, the army of the Shah was made up of 
approximately 16,000 soldiers.  Of these 16,000 soldiers, 4,000 were veteran cavalrymen 
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from the reign of Nadir Shah Afshar.47,48  As the years progressed, the army expanded to 
40,000 soldiers.  This exponential expansion in numbers of soldiers was primarily due to 
the system of conscription in exchange for land allotments, known as jagirs that the 
leadership of the Afghan tribes and the Shah had agreed upon.  Generally speaking, the 
number of conscripts contributed by the Afghan tribes to serve in the army of the Shah 
was directly proportional to the size of the jagirs granted to the tribal leaders by the Shah.  
Since the Durrani Pashtuns were in possession of a relatively large amount of territory, 
they were also required to supply the majority of the soldiers.49  However, the Shah did 
not necessarily uniformly apply this practice. The Alikozai, a Durrani Pashtun subtribe, 
received almost twenty-five percent more land than the Nurzai tribe, another Durrani 
Pashtun subtribe, but provided fewer soldiers.50  Other non-Durrani Pastun tribes, such as 
the Ghilzai, and non-Pashtun tribes, such as the Qizalbash, provided sizeable conscript 
contributions, even though their jagirs were much less in size in comparison those 
granted to the Durrani Pashtun tribes.51  This was most likely due to the non-Pashtun 
tribes being militarily weaker, and thus unable to offer any substantial resistance to the 
strength and influence of the Pashtun tribes.  By the height of his power, the Shah’s army 
had grown to approximately 120,000 men.52 
D. ACQUIRING REVENUE FOR THE ARMY 
Even though Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani possessed access to portions of the 
treasure of Nadir Shah Afshar, this treasure alone was not sufficient to cover the total 
operating costs of the army.  At the height of the Ahmad Khan Durrani’s reign, the army 
was costing approximately 30 million rupees annually.53  In order to acquire the 
necessary revenue to sustain the operating costs of the army, the Shah needed to impose a 
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system of taxation on the Afghan population without adversely impacting the monarchy’s 
cooperative relationship with the tribes.  This was accomplished by the preferential 
appointment of tribal leaders to state offices responsible for the collection of tax revenues 
as well as managing the conscription of soldiers from the tribal populations. 
Land tax revenues were the principal means that Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani’s 
monarchy could extract income from the Afghan population.  Taxation was mainly 
applied to agricultural produce according to fixed proportions.  These fixed proportions 
varied with the nature of the land and from province to province.54 The approach of the 
Shah was to govern tribes lightly while levying heavy taxes on the nontribal parts of the 
empire.   
The practice of government has been to exact little from those in the west, 
and use them for defense alone; but to avail itself of the resources of the 
eastern provinces, and of the means they afforded for the extension of 
territory.55   
“Those in the west” were the Pashtun tribes.  As previously mentioned, they were 
the most militarily superior tribe of all the Afghan tribes.56  Their military superiority 
also meant that the Pashtun tribes also became the most privileged of the Afghan tribes 
since Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani required their cooperation and support in particular to 
sustain his rule.57   
The cooperation and support of the Pashtun tribes was acquired through 
exemptions from capitation taxes.  Pashtun tribes were also exempted from taxation of 
their land, cattle, orchards of fruit trees, and vineyards.58  Since the Shah understood that 
the tribal chieftans and feudal lords were bent on preserving their privileged positions, 
aside from confirming landholdings onto them, he also bestowed many of the important 
state offices of the monarchy upon various Durrani Pashtun khans, making these offices 
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to either explicitly or implicitly be held within specific clans.59,60  Some Durrani khans 
became the local administrators of the jagir system previously mentioned.  As the 
administrators of the jagir system, these Durrani khans established quasi-independent 
baronies.  Doing so effectively preserved the relative autonomy of the khans while 
simultaneously fostering a cooperative relationship with the monarchy by placing them in 
a position to serve the state.61  Even though it was common practice for the Durrani 
khans to progressively take an ever-increasing proportion of the collected tax revenues 
for their services, there did not seem to be any objections so long as the tribes continued 
to provide their support for the monarchy.  Not only did the Shah now have agents of the 
monarchy in place to collect tax revenues for the state, these khans were also able to 
ensure that the tribes continued to provide their requisite numbers of men to serve as 
conscripts in the Shah’s army.62  This was particularly important since the bulk of the 
Shah’s army was composed of  “irregular troops” vice professional soldiers.63,64  Luckily 
for the Shah, providing these “foot levies” of tribal and non-tribal peasants and artisans to 
take part in warfare under the leadership of feudal khans and other elders was a 
customary practice.65  In order to foster the continued cooperation of the tribes, the 
leaders of the Duranni clans were permitted to retain their tribal subdivisions within the 
monarchy’s army, with head of each clan commanding the contingent of men provided to 
the king.66  This dependence on “irregular troops” to fill ranks of the monarchy’s army 
indirectly permitted the tribes to restrict the Shah’s power.   
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Ahmad Khan Durrani possessed a talent for war and was aware that the Afghan 
people appreciated such ability.67  As previously mentioned, the Shah had served as the 
leader of the elite corps of Nadir Shah Afshir’s military known as the Abdalis.68  This 
experience most likely influenced the Ahmad Khan Durrani into pursuing expansionism 
of the Afghan empire.69  Not only did the Shah possess a familiarity with the relative 
weakness of Afghanistan’s territorial neighbors, but he also knew that directing the 
restless energies of the Afghan tribes towards an exterior target would prevent them from 
pursing the traditional path of campaigning to overthrow existing khanates, or in the case 
of the Ahmad Khan Durrani, the monarchy.70  During his reign, the Shah led eight 
expeditions into the territories of India.  The justification for war against the Sikhs and 
Hindus residing within the territories of India was framed within an Islamic context in 
order to more easily garner the support of the Afghan population. 71  The cruelty 
associated with the attacks he applied towards the Sikhs and Hindus of British India have 
been described as merely a reflection of the customs of the times and practices of his 
opponents.72  These expeditionary campaigns resulted in the incorporation of the Punjab, 
Kashmir, and Multan into the Afghan Empire.73  In addition to expanding the territories 
of the Afghan Empire, the expeditions into the British India territories also provided 
Ahmad Khan Durrani and his army with necessary spoils of war that would be used to 
supplement the revenue needed to monetarily sustain the army of the monarchy.  
However, since the “irregular troops” were unwilling to spend more than a year away 
from home, Ahmad Khan Durrani was often forced to end his expeditionary campaigns 
prematurely in order appease their discontentment.74  When funds grew short, the Shah 
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would collect his army from the tribes and return to the battlefields.75  After the secession 
of the Indian provinces from where the bulk of revenue was extracted, Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, as well as his successors, fell victim to the British policy of subsidy—which 
ultimately became the essential means of consolidating the state vis-à-vis the tribes.76 
E. CONCLUSION 
The nation-building efforts of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani were largely focused on 
the building of an army loyal to the monarchy and maintaining the cooperation of the 
tribal leadership that had appointed him to rule.  By the end of his reign, the Shah had 
created an Afghan nation possessing a system of central governance that was heavily 
reliant on establishing and sustaining a cooperative relationship with the tribes through a 
system of patronage.  Land allotments, preferential appointment to government stations, 
and exemption on taxation to the Pashtun tribes were used to sustain this cooperative 
relationship.  This discussion of Ahmad Khan Durrani’s reign also shows that the 
administration of governance by the Shah and his regime did not go beyond the 
sustainment of the monarchy’s cooperative relationship with the tribes.  This trend will 
also be evident in the following discussion of the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.   
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III. AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN (1880–1901) 
Few kings so great have been more hated than Abdur Rahman.77 
Abdur Rahman has been described as an outstanding monarch, a man of 
shrewdness, clear judgment, and iron will.78  He inherited a country that had been 
weakened by wars and foreign occupation in addition to being torn by internecine 
warfare.79  When Abdur Rahman became the Amir of Afghanistan, the conditions within 
the country were volatile and chaotic.  However, by the end of his rule, he did leave 
behind a nation.  Author Arnold Fletcher writes that the Amir was a hard man, who 
“ruled a hard people.”80  He possessed the reputation of being brutally oppressive.81  By 
the force of his unrelenting personality, he goaded his people out of the Middle Ages and 
into something resembling the eighteenth century.82  With the assistance of foreign 
military and monetary subsidies from the British, Abdur Rahman was able to turn 
Afghanistan into a relatively pacified nation-state ruled by a centralized government.  It 
was during this period in Afghan history that the foundation for the modern nation-state 
was laid.  The basic structure of this centralized government was composed of a Pashtun 
ruler, a nominally centralized bureaucracy, and a national army that heavily relied on the 
support of foreign aid from the British Empire.83  This basic central governance structure 
has endured until 1992.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how Amir Abdur 
Rahman was able to develop and sustain central governance rule over Afghanistan during 
his reign.  Like Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani, Abdur Rahman envisioned an Afghanistan 
that was under the rule of a central authority.  Both rulers understood that cooperation 
with the tribes was necessary to administer governance, particularly in the collection of 
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revenue from the Afghan population through taxation.  However, like Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, Abdur Rahman also sought to sever the dependence of the monarchy on the 
tribes.  
A. ASCENSION TO POWER 
Abdur Rahman was the first monarch of Afghanistan to justify his rule through 
religion.  Before his death, Dost Mohammad Khan nominated his son, Abdur Rahman, to 
be his successor as the ruler of Afghanistan.  Ever since the reign of Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, the sustainment of the monarchy was linked to the support of a council of tribal 
sardars (also known as a jirga).  Since the monarchy relied upon the support and 
cooperation of the sardars to administer governance on behalf of the central authority, 
particularly in the collection of taxes and the conscription of men for the army of 
monarchy, the sardars inherently possessed the ability to confer or challenge the 
legitimacy of the ruler.  Like Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani, Abdur Rahman realized that the 
monarchy needed to gain independence from its reliance on the support of the Afghan 
tribes while still retaining their cooperation.  Therefore, Abdur Rahman began to redefine 
the source of the monarch’s legitimacy from the jirga to the religion of Islam by 
proclaiming that God had bestowed upon him the “divine right” to serve as the ruler of 
the Afghan nation.84  “Divine right” provided Abdur Rahman with a powerful 
justification for his rule as the monarchy of Afghanistan that could not be easily contested 
by the jirga.  Islamic legitimization of his rule was also an easily comprehendible and a 
relatively convincing rationalization for the Afghan people to accept.  By framing the 
legitimization of his rule within an Islamic context, Abdur Rahman was able to 
circumvent the traditional endorsement of the jirga and directly obtain the support of the 
Afghan people. 
B. BALANCING INDEPENDENCE AND COOPERATION 
During Abdur Rahman’s reign as the Amir (or King) of Afghanistan, he was still 
forced to achieve a balance between breaking from the support of the Afghan tribes, 
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while still retaining their support.  He was able to achieve this balance by progressively 
relying less upon the resources of the tribes to support the army of the monarchy while 
establishing state level consultative institutions in which tribal leaders could participate in 
the administration of governance on a limited basis.  As the strength of the monarchy 
grew through the growth of the army, rule of law administered by the central authority, 
the establishment of a robust security apparatus to enforce the laws of the state, the 
reliance on the tribal leadership to support the central government of Afghanistan 
diminished.  
1. The Army of the Amir 
Abdur Rahman understood that his regime required an army loyal to the 
monarchy that could consolidate his dynasty by eliminating his rivals and establishing an 
absolute government and to shield Afghanistan against foreign invasion.85  The army 
would serve as the Amir’s institution for control of the Afghan nation and the 
implementation of central government authority.86  The creation of a standing and 
centralized Afghan army would become Abdur Rahman’s single greatest achievement.    
Abdur Rahman inherited an army that was feudal and tribal in character.  He was 
eventually able to transform the army into a professional and disciplined force that was 
paid and independent of tribal control.  At beginning of Abdur Rahman’s reign, the army 
was weak in administration, discipline, logistics, and armaments, and lacked a trained 
officer corps despite the assistance of foreign advisors.87  Unlike his predecessors, Abdur 
Rahman neither sought the services of foreign officers nor showed willingness to accept 
the council of British officers or engineers.  The Amir began to strengthen his army by 
improving its organization and training.88  In terms of organization, Afghan commanders 
were recruited from the politically most reliable groups, which were largely composed of 
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the landed gentry and the well-to-do.89  This practice ultimately created an identification 
of the Amir’s military with the elders and well-to-do of the Afghanistan.90  Regular 
soldiers for the army were obtained through conscription and the pacification of militarily 
weaker tribes.  For many of the tribes, conscription remained a traditional practice where 
men between the ages of 14 and 50 were first recruited into the army first on a voluntary 
basis.91  Village or clan elders would then administer the system of indirect conscription 
where each group of eight 20–40 year old men would be obligated by the tribe to serve in 
the army of the monarchy while the remaining households were taxed to monetarily 
provide for their support.92  As the Amir pacified revolting tribes, the general rule was 
that recruitment for the army would be made from them. 93  This process of recruitment 
followed the changing loyalty of the tribal communities: the Hazara, the Qizilbash, and 
the Ghilzai, who were dominant up to 1880, gave way after various uprisings to a 
majority of the Durrani.94   
Unfortunately, the social and ethnic diversity of the army did possess inherent 
difficulties that stemmed from traditional and historic tribal and regional rivalries.  For 
example, since the officers were recruited from the landed gentry and well-to-do, this 
often led to prejudicial treatment between them and the soldiers.  Another example was 
the practice of placing army units raised in one tribal region and stationing them in 
another.  As a rule, troops were stationed outside their respective provinces of origin in 
order to separate soldiers from their own people so that they could be used against other 
tribes when necessary.  Interestingly, this practice has continued under all later 
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governments.95  Additionally, the Amir did not permit soldiers stationed in a region to 
mix with the local people.  He presumed that they might lose the fighting spirit if this 
fraternization were allowed to occur.96 
Equipping of Abdur Rahman’s army was carried out using both indigenous and 
foreign resources.  The Amir increased the government’s capacity to manufacture its own 
military equipment by establishing factories that produced modern small arms, field 
artillery, and numerous other noncombat items.97,98  However, this means of resourcing 
the army was not as substantial as the funding and arms obtained through British 
subsidies and contributions.  Between 1880 and 1895, the British presented the Amir 
with, 80 cannons, 17,342 shots and shells, 33,302 rifles, 3,200 carbines, and 21,308,000 
cartridges.99  In 1889, the British government of India provided approximately an 
additional 74 cannons, 25,000 breech-loading rifles, 11,500 muzzle-loading rifles, and 
several million rounds of ammunition.100  From the perspective of the British Empire, 
these arms contributions along with additional contingents of British ground forces were 
used to bolster the security of Afghanistan’s Northwest Frontier since this territory served 
as a geographic buffer between the territories of British India and territories belonging to 
Russia.  From the perspective of Abdur Rahman, possession of all this weaponry 
provided the army of the monarchy with a technological superiority that had surpassed 
that of the tribal militias.   
British subsidies provided the monarchy of Abdur Rahman with substantial 
revenue that would be used to pay his professional army.  From 1880–1881, he received 
3,615,009 rupees in foreign monetary assistance.  In 1882, the British granted the amir a 
yearly subsidy of 1.2 million Indian rupees.  This amount was raised to 1.8 million Indian 
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rupees after the formal demarcation of the Durrand Line in 1893, and to 1.85 million in 
1897, when the British and Russians forced the Amir to accept the addition to his realm 
of the Wakhan Corridor.101  The money received through British subsidies enabled 
Abdur Rahman to employ troops rather than solely relying on tribal levies or conscripts 
received in exchange for land allotments.102  The loyalty and morale of the army was 
considerably improved since soldiers were for the first time being paid salaries at levels 
that were meeting subsistence needs.103 
C. BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO GOVERN 
Since Abdur Rahman was now receiving substantial numbers of arms and foreign 
subsidies from the British, he was now able to rely less on the support and resources of 
the tribes to sustain his army.  Military recruitment, however, remained based upon 
universal conscription from the tribes.104  However, the Amir no longer had to heavily 
rely upon the collection taxes from the tribes to raise revenues for the monarchy.  This 
however did not necessarily mean that the collection of tax revenues ceased.  The 
strengthening of the monarchy’s army through the receipt of British arms and subsidies 
provided Abdur Rahman with the opportunity to expand the capacity of the central 
authority to administer governance that was still able to obtain the cooperation of tribal 
leaders.  Expansion of the monarchy’s capacity to administer governance took the form 
of the establishment of state consultative institutions, the creation of state laws, and the 
implementation of a security apparatus to enforce state laws. 
1. State Institutionalization 
Even though Abdur Rahman now relied less upon the tribal councils to provide 
legitimacy to the monarchy and resource the army of the monarchy, he did still require 
their cooperation.  Tribal sardars still played a significant role in maintaining order, 
colleting tax revenues for the state in rural area that the state was still unable influence, 
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and provide conscripts to the army.  One means by which Abdur Rahman was able to 
obtain the continued support of the tribal leaders was through the establishment of state 
institutions.   
The darbar-i shahi was a state institution composed of a council of tribal chiefs.  
The purpose of this state institution was twofold.  Abdur Rahman was able obtain the 
continued support of the tribal chiefs by providing them with the sense that he still 
desired their counsel with respect to the affairs of the state.  This state institution was 
composed of a general assembly made up of three categories of representatives:  
 Sardars (aristocrats, chiefly members of the royal family or clan) 
 Khawanin mulki (commoners, mainly khans or landed proprietors) 
 Mullahs (religious representatives) 
The inputs received from this institution remained strictly consultative.105  This 
council did not possess any executive of legislative authorities.  In order to ensure that the 
assembly did not challenge the authority of the monarchy, the selection of the assembly’s 
members was subject to the approval of Abdur Rahman.  The Amir also formed a 
selective body known as a khilwat to serve as a supreme council or cabinet.  The function 
of this council was to execute the will of Abdur Rahman.106  The state institution of a 
consultative assembly, also known as a Loya Jirga (Pashtu for Great Assembly), has 
endured throughout the reigns of subsequent rulers to Abdur Rahman.  Even though this 
practice has evoked the traditions of tribal republicanism, this assembly in almost nearly 
every case was composed of appointed representatives who assented to the decree of the 
ruler.107   
2. Rule of Law 
Law had special interest to the Amir.  Since Afghanistan did not possess a 
uniform code of laws, Abdur Rahman pursued the establishment of codified laws.  In 
order to ensure that these laws were relatively well received and understood by the 
Afghan people, they were written to conform with the principles of Islamic law, or Sharia 
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as interpreted by Abu Hanifa, to local Afghan customs, and were in the spirit of Afghan 
tribal code.108  Keeping in mind that Abdur Rahman’s objective was to establish and 
sustain order within the Afghan kingdom, the new criminal code prescribed harsh 
punishments for cases threatening the welfare of the Afghan people or disrupting the 
peace and stability of the country.109  Since Abdur Rahman was a firm believer in the 
preventative power of terror, his criminal law was savage.  The application of torture for 
violations of the criminal law was frequent and imaginative.  On example of the brutality 
of the punishments imposed by the laws of Abdur Rahman included robbers being caged 
alive and left for dead on along the King’s highway to warn others of the price to be paid 
by those who disturb the peace on the highway.  Another example of Abdur Rahman’s 
brutality was when an official who had outraged a woman was stripped naked and placed 
in a hole.  Since it was mid-winter, water was poured upon him until he was converted 
into an icicle and frozen alive.  In another case, two men who were overheard talking 
about a forbidden subject were ordered to have their lips stitched together so that should 
never offend again.  A man who came to the palace of the Amir and openly accused him 
of depravity and crime had his tongue torn out by the roots.110  Luckless prisoners were 
expected to purchase their food and pay rent for their cells. 111  Rebellious leaders were 
usually branded as traitors and outlaws, and were sentenced to death.112 
Abdur Rahman relied upon a robust security apparatus to enforce the laws he had 
established and maintain order.  A ruthless police force accompanied by a network of 
spies and informers were deployed to uncover conspiracies and confound enemies, both 
within the confines of the court as well as the distant corners of his kingdom.113  Abdur 
Rahman’s brutality and repressive tendencies were further perpetuated by the arrests, 
torture, and eliminations of both real and potential disobedient officials and suspected 
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opponents made by his security apparatus.114  This security apparatus, which was 
reinforced by the strength of the Amir’s army, demonstrated particular effectiveness at 
crushing challenges to the state and deflecting all forms of protest short of open 
rebellion.115  Wholesale executions and deportations usually followed the suppression of 
each rebellion.116  From the Amir’s point of view, such practices were necessary to 
ensure his monopoly on power. 
Abdul Rahman’s brutality and repressiveness gave rise to forty disturbances, 
including ten major rebellions, four of which he called civil wars.  Three more notable 
rebellions that tested the army and the monarchy took place in 1886 against the Ghilzai, 
in 1891 against the Mongol Shia Hazaras, and the conflicts against the Kafirs of Eastern 
Afghanistan.117  In 1886, the Amir’s insight of tribal politics enabled him to exploit the 
historical rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzais to suppress the Ghilzai rebellion and 
force them to pay regular taxes—and in fact against all the feudal lords and tribal 
chieftans who revolted against the monarchy.118  His familiarity with religious politics 
allowed him to appeal to the orthodoxy and fanaticism of Sunni Muslims in order to 
secure thousands of volunteers and ghazis (fighters of the faith) in order to subdue the 
rebellion of Shia Hazaras in 1891.  In order to garner forces against the Kafirs of Eastern 
Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman exploited the stirrings of political consciousness, evoking 
memories of the former greatness of the Durrani Empire, to muster the support of the 
Afghan tribes in his attempt to reestablish firm control over the ethnically non-Afghan 
territories of Eastern Afghanistan.119  Undoubtedly, Abdur Rahman set himself the task 
of ensuring by military means his domination over most of the Afghan territories.  
However, a number of regions did still enjoyed de facto autonomy.120 
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D. EXPANDING THE INFLUENCE OF THE STATE 
The growing strength of the monarchy’s army accompanied with the effectiveness 
of the security apparatus at administering rule of law enabled Abdur Rahman to apply a 
sort of “internal imperialism” in order to spread his influence and control throughout the 
territories of the Afghan nation.121  The reputation of the Amir was once again 
perpetuated through the means he employed, of which included the impartial use of 
bribery, murder, torture, and treachery.122  Much time and energy was devoted in 
attempts to penetrate and pacify zones of relative inaccessibility.123  Abdur Rahman’s 
state administrative apparatus was relatively successful to extend into the provincial and 
sub-provincial level of the Afghan territories.  Provinces were established in the more 
urban regions of the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Heart, and Mazar-i-Shari.  Unlike prior 
rulers, Abdur Rahman kept his sons in Kabul and appointed loyal followers as provincial 
governors.  These provincial governors were given a free hand so long as they maintained 
order by administering justice and sent the required taxes collected as well as conscripts 
to Kabul. 124.125 
Abdur Rahman’s process of internal imperialism applied a policy of mild 
repression toward the frontier areas.  The Amir’s administration of governance was not 
necessarily conducted in a uniform basis.126  Force, bloody reprisals, matrimonial 
alliances, bribes, and intrigues were all used to manipulate and overcome tribal resistance 
to his authority.  Abdur Rahman used his own marriages in addition to those of his sons 
to tighten ties with tribal sardars, religious leaders, and important members of non-
Afghan ethnic groups.  He also employed a feudal policy by inviting feudal sardars to 
Kabul in order to grant them subsidies in some cases, destroy strongholds and 
fortifications in other cases, and taking hostages.127  Abdul Rahman Khan devoted his 
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efforts to crushing, not institutionalizing tribal coalitions.128  These acts prevented any 
one group from creating alliances with other tribes and achieving a level of sufficient 
military strength to challenge and overthrow the monarchy.  Each local kinship based 
group (qawm) remained isolated, tied to the nation-state only by personal ties to 
individuals in the state apparatus of the monarchy.129  Rather than integrating the various 
sectors of the population into a common national political system, Abdur Rahman’s 
feudal practices created an ethnically stratified hierarchy of intermediaries that provided 
resources to their respective groups of kinship-linked patrons.130  Governance merely 
became the managing of conflicts between patrons competing for the lagrasse (or 
generosity of the monarchy).   
One means used by Abdur Rahman to manage feudal conflicts was the forced 
migration of dissident tribes residing within Afghan territories.  The objective of the 
forced migrations was to break the power and independence of these tribes.131  From the 
late 1880s to the early 1890s, Abdur Rahman ordered the forced migration of 
approximately 10,000 Ghilzai Pashtun families from their southern and south-central 
territories near the Ghazni region north to the Hindu Kush where they dwell today.132  
The purpose of this act was two-fold.  Removing the Ghilzai Pashtun from their ethnic 
homeland areas weakened their ability to promote revolt against the state within their 
historic territories of influence.  Second, shifting the Ghilzai Pashtun north created a 
force loyal to the Amir.  Ghilzai Pashtuns residing within their historic tribal territories 
territorial zones may have been hostile towards Durrani-Pashtuns, and thus Abdur 
Rahman.  However, Ghilzai Pashtuns residing in northern non-Pashtun territories were 
forced to ally with Durrani Pashtuns and the monarchy in order to receive their support 
and assistance if required.133  In order to keep groups in the territories where they had 
been forced to migrate, Abdur Rahman would in general deny the right for Afghans to 
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travel freely within the country as well as outside of the country without the expressed 
consent of the government.
134  Even journeys of only more than a few kilometers outside 
Kabul had to be authorized by the police.135  This policy remained law until the 
constitution of 1964 that permitted Afghans the right to free movement inside and outside 
the country.136 
Overall, despite the brutally repressive imperialism practiced by Abdur Rahman, 
he somehow still managed to unify the Afghan nation politically, establishing the first 
thoroughly centralized regime in the country.137 
E. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
As mentioned previously, the state of Afghanistan was created as a geographic 
buffer between the eastern territories of South Asia of the British Empire and the northern 
territories of Central Asia that belonged to Russia.138  Abdur Rahman again demonstrated 
his political capacity by exploiting the Anglo-Russian colonial rivalries to further his own 
objectives.139  He recognized that in order to consolidate his authority over the Afghan 
nation, he had to ensure that both the British and Russians would accept his regime.140  In 
1880, the Amir agreed to British supervision over the foreign affairs of Afghanistan in 
return for a subsidy and their noninterference in his attempts to gain control over the 
entire country.141   The British agreed to have only one representative in Afghanistan, an 
Indian Muslim.  Russia agreed that it had no interest in extending its influence into the 
territory of Afghanistan.142 
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In general, except for a handful of military technicians, such as British physicians 
and engineers, Indian printers, French engineers, in his personal employ, Abdur Rahman 
tended to block the introduction of foreigners and their influences into Afghanistan while 
still maintaining accessibility to foreign aid and technology.143,144  He was indeed aware 
of the potential of the natural resources of Afghanistan and of the benefits that European 
technical advice could bring that could improve the financial handicaps generated by the 
regime’s relative inefficiency in extracting substantial monetary revenue from the Afghan 
population.  However, he also persisted in not opening up Afghanistan and permitting 
foreign interests to exploit the country’s natural wealth.  Making Afghanistan easily 
accessible would permit foreign powers to easily enter and spread themselves throughout 
the country.145  For Abdur Rahman, Afghan independence and military security needed 
to be sustained, regardless of the economic costs of maintaining the country in isolation 
to minimize unwanted foreign intrusion and influences. 146  The Amir’s strong desire and 
intent to preserve the dominion of Afghanistan was evident in the following statement to 
his sons.   
I would most strenuously advise my sons and successors not to give the 
monopoly of their minerals to any foreigner, nor to let their mines be 
worked by any foreign companies, otherwise they will be immersed in any 
complications, thereby giving an excuse to foreign nations to interfere in 
the affairs of the country, for the sake of greed, which is growing 
unbearable from day to day. 147 
Interestingly, this philosophy has persisted throughout the years and had been the basis of 
Afghan foreign and domestic policy.148  Instead, he continued to rely on the continued 
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receipt of British subsidies, stiff taxes on the Afghan inhabitants, and the relatively small 
amounts of income derived from his workshops to finance his regime. 
F. CONCLUSION 
By the end of his reign, Abdur Rahman had created a powerful police state that 
was so brutally repressive that subversive talk could land a person in jail or worse.149  By 
convincing himself of his own divinely favored status, Abdur Rahman Khan was able to 
act in a fearless manner, supporting his conviction through action, thereby fulfilling his 
self-proclaimed destiny as the ruler of Afghanistan.150  His ability to impose the will of 
the monarchy upon the tribes was principally due to the financial subsidies and arms that 
were provided by the British from 1880–1919.151  These weapons and cash enabled the 
Amir to establish an absolutist state that employed a brutal police force capable of 
crushing more than forty revolts by local tribal force when supplemented by the 
monarchy’s army.152  The Amir was unwilling to compromise or jeopardize his power or 
the independence of Afghanistan in any way.153  The greatest safety of Afghanistan lied 
in its natural impregnable position.154  This discussion of Abdur Rahman’s regime has 
shown how accepting arms and foreign subsidies from the British enabled the Amir to 
shift away from solely focusing his efforts on building an army loyal to the monarchy and 
breaking ties from the powerful and autonomous tribes.  The Amir was able to administer 
governance through the creation and administration of rule of law and expanding central 
government authority into the rural territories.   
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IV. KING MOHAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH (1933–1973) 
The role of central governance in Afghanistan has evolved substantially since the 
reign of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani.  Some of the more drastic nation-building definitely 
took place during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman through the growing independence of 
the central authority to sever its reliance on the support of the tribes to effectively 
administer governance.  During the reigns of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani and Amir Abdur 
Rahman, the efforts of these rulers were largely focused on building the capacity of the 
central authority to rule the Afghan nation rather than administering governance.  Abdur 
Rahman was eventually able to transition efforts from capacity building to governance, 
but this was only after he was able to enforce rule of law through the brutality of his 
punishments and the presence of a robust security apparatus supplemented by a 
professional army loyal to the monarchy.  King Mohammad Zahir Shah is perceived by 
Afghan people with a respect and admiration equaled only to the founder of the Afghan 
nation, Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani.155 After 30 years of tutelage, King Mohammad Zahir 
Shah exhibited a strength few realized he possessed.  He hoped to move Afghanistan 
towards more responsible governance and eventually establish a constitutional monarchy 
based upon democratically chosen representation.156  King Mohammad Zahir Shah’s 
administration of governance possessed more liberal tendencies in comparison to the 
practices of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.  The liberal 
nature of his governance did however limit King Mohammad Zahir Shah’s ability to rule 
in the absolute sense.157  The characteristic that is most unique about the reign of King 
Mohammad Zahir Shah is that his period of rule was known to many as a long 
“springtime of peace and gentility.”158  Afghanistan was for the most part politically 
stable and able to avoid both international conflicts as well as any significant internal 
rebellions.  During this time, a few changes to the administration of governance were 
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introduced and incorporated, but only at a “glacial pace.”159   The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine how the administration of the governance by the King was able to foster 
this period of relative peace in Afghanistan.   
A. ASCENSION TO POWER 
King Mohammad Zahir Shah was the designated ruler of Afghanistan from 1933–
1973.  However, he did not actually govern the state until 1963.  The first 30 years of the 
King’s reign were governed by Mohammad Zahir’s uncles since he was not yet of proper 
age to govern.  This practice was befitting of Islamic and Afghan cultural traditions.  
From 1933–1946, Muhammad Hashim ruled the territories of Afghanistan autocratically.  
In 1946, Shah Mamud replaced Muhammad Hashim and ruled until 1953.160  In 1953, 
Muhammad Daud, the cousin of Zahir Shah ruled until the he finally took over on 09 
March 1963.161  This period of rule was known as the regime of the Musahiban. During 
his reign, King Mohmmad Zahir Shah actively made his presence known to the Afghan 
people by travelling widely throughout the Afghan territories, mingling paternally with 
the population.  Before his appearance, some of the more remote and isolated tribal 
communities still believed that Habibullah (1901–1919) or Amanullah (1919–1929) still 
ruled the country.162  Many of the remote villages that were visited spoke fondly of the 
King.163  Today, the stability and peace of Musahiban era has been praised as a “golden 
age.”164     
B. FOSTERING RELATIVE PEACE 
The reign of the Musahiban gave Afghanistan its longest interval of relative 
peace.  The Musahibans maintained their rule over Afghanistan by focusing the efforts of 
the central authority on the sustainment of internal stability. Their vision for Afghanistan 
was composed of a structured relationship between the state and society aimed at 
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modernizing the country and facilitating economic development.  A strategy of limited 
and gradual social change was pursued with the hope of avoiding internal rebellion based 
on the preservation of Afghan conservatism.  Changes would begin in Kabul and move 
outward in a manner that would facilitate change without it appearing as if the monarchy 
was imposing it.165  In the 1960s, Afghanistan experienced economic and social 
development at a pace that the country had ever experienced in the past.  This period of 
accelerated economic and social development was partially attributed to the regime 
opening the country up to the outside world, effectively ending the practice of isolation 
that had been imposed Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.166    
The Musahibans realized that many of the Afghan rural rebellions that had taken 
place in the past that were justified in an Islamic context had initially been provoked by 
attempts of the central government to impose economic pressure or taxation on the rural 
territories in return for greater political subservience.  As the decades have progressed, 
the revenue amounts collected from the rural territories of Afghanistan have declined.  
Eventually, these revenues were no longer a significant source of funding for the state.167  
Revenues acquired through trade tariffs, government monopoly on commercial business 
activities, and in particular foreign aid and loans became the primary sources.  As the 
state began to rely less on revenues obtained through rural taxation, the need for corrupt 
tax officials who commonly siphoned more than their fair share was eliminated.  
Tensions between Kabul and the communities of the rural territories eventually eased 
since the monarchy relied even less on the direct taxation of the tribal populations, 
effectively making the central government less invasive in the affairs of the rural 
communities.   
Political stability in rural Afghanistan under the Musahibans rested on the implied 
recognition of two distinct power structures: the provincial and subprovincial 
administrations.  Both the provincial and subprovincial administration served as arms of 
the central government embedded within the tribal or village structures indigenous to 
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each region.168  Provincial officials, who were the local representatives of the central 
government, carried out a limited agenda.169  Their function was to use their limited 
resources and influence to keep the peace, suppress banditry, oversee that the traditional 
practice of conscription was still carried out, and continue to collect whatever small 
amounts of tax revenue that were required by the central government.  Provincial officials 
were not expected to engage in social service projects that might require greater local 
cooperation than the government was able to facilitate.170  Therefore, the invasiveness of 
the central government in the affairs of the rural tribal communities was limited to 
monitoring and influencing local political structures to prevent them from causing trouble 
for the central authority.171  The aim was not to replace or transform the deep-rooted 
traditional social organizations, or qawms, that most people lived their lives.  The qawm 
still remained the primary provider of support to the community that was outside the 
official channels of the central government. 172  The qawm was crucial to the conduct of 
daily life.    
When it was necessary for the Musahiban government to become more invasive 
in the affairs of the rural populations, they were only effective when a specific target was 
identified for punitive action.  In 1975, the central government was relatively effective at 
expelling, capturing, or killing Islamic radicals attempting to raise rebellions in the 
countryside of Eastern Afghanistan.  The action of the central government was so 
determined and immediate that villages began to expel rebellious ringleaders because 
they were perceived as bringing trouble to people who wanted no part of their ideological 
objections and conflicts with the central government. 173   
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C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY 
King Mohammad Zahir Shah was the first ruler of Afghanistan to implement 
relatively functional and institutionalized central governance.  This was evident in the 
creation of the 1964 Afghan constitution. The Yousug Cabinet was established shortly 
after Mohammad Zahir Shah assumed power in March of 1963.  The purpose of this 
cabinet was to appoint a seven member constitutional committee that would be tasked 
with writing a more liberalized constitution for Afghanistan.  The constitutional 
committee was composed of prominent Afghans possessing the reputation of being 
oriented towards the adoption and implementation of governmental reforms.  In February 
1964, the committee completed the draft of the new constitution.174 A twenty-nine 
member Constitutional Advisory Commission, of which two of the members were 
women, was then appointed to review the submitted draft constitution before a Loya 
Jirga was to approve it.175  After months of debate amongst the Loya Jirga, the 
constitution was signed on October 1, 1964.176 
The Afghan constitution of 1964 instituted the election of a consultative 
parliament, or Shura.  The Shura was composed of an upper house known as the 
Meshrano Jirga (House of Nobles) and a lower house known as the Wolesi Jirga (House 
of the People). 177  During the decade that Afghanistan was under constitutional rule, 
which was known as “New Democracy”, two national elections were conducted by the 
central government.  Few Afghans actually participated in the first elections.  The 
majority of he ninety-five percent non-literate Afghans that lived in villages and nomadic 
camps throughout the rural territories of Afghanistan knew little of King Mohammad 
Zahir Shah’s new Constitution and the “New Democracy” administering central 
governance from Kabul.178  The relatively small percentage of the Afghan population 
that were interested in the reforms articulated within the constitution were the growing 
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factions of the intelligentsia that had risen from the state’s newly expanded educational 
system.179  These intelligentsia primarily inhabited the urban centers of Kabul, Kandahar, 
Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, and Kunduz, and began to organize politically, 
launching nationalist, communist, and Islamic movements with corresponding links to the 
international community.180,181  Even though the state relied on this group to run the 
expanding bureaucracy, as well as staff the growing army, its members did not possess 
political power or institutionalized channels of participation to affect the central 
authority.182  Even though the members of the intelligentsia were not permitted to form 
political parties and compete in the parliamentary elections, this did not stop their 
criticisms of King Mohammad Zahir Shah or his “New Democracy.”  One critical 
critique of the monarchy was the relative slowness at which central governance of 
Afghanistan, or more specifically the urban areas of the country, was moving towards 
what they perceived as a “true” democracy.  From the position of the monarchy, what 
these dissident (Western educated) intellectuals desired was an “instant democracy” 
where one would take a dry constitution, combine with fluid elections and stir, and voila, 
“instant democracy”—without the agony of generations of development.  It was later 
realized that the members of the intelligentsia were actually seeking to institute an 
Afghan brand of socialism.183  “The people won’t wait,” they said, but what they really 
meant was that, “We [the intelligentsia not in power] won’t wait.  We want power to 
implement our own ideas and create an Afghanistan in our own image.”184 
D. CONCLUSION 
The reign of King Mohammad Zahir Shah differed from that of Shah Ahmad 
Khan Durrani and Amir Abdur Rahman.  The efforts of King Mohammad Zahir Shah 
were more focused on the administration of governance as opposed to the building the 
capacity to govern that so preoccupied the regimes of Ahmad Shah and Abdur Rahman.  
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The King was able to economically and socially advance the state of Afghanistan by 
permitting the introduction and incorporation of foreign influences.  Even less reliance on 
the cooperation of the tribes was necessary due to foreign subsides, tariffs on foreign 
trade, and monopolies on government owned commercial business becoming the primary 
source of government revenues instead of taxation imposed on the Afghan population.  
The creation and implementation of an Afghan constitution in 1964 provided the first 
signs the incorporation of democratic practices through the conduct of parliamentary 
elections. 
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V. PRESIDENT HAMID KARZAI (2001–PRESENT) 
For the past nine years, President Hamid Karzai has been involved in central 
governance development and nation building in Afghanistan of the likes that in the 
opinion of this author have not been undertaken since the reign of Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani.  President Karzai and his administration, with the assistance of the international 
community, is attempting to establish and develop a level of central governmental 
institutionalization that hasn’t been pursued in Afghanistan by an Afghan ruler since the 
reign of Amir Abdur Rahman, that possesses the liberal political inclusion that was 
fostered by and characteristic of the reign of King Mohammad Zahir Shah.  As President 
Karzai attempts to take on the scope of nation building that is presently underway in 
Afghanistan, he is doing so as a ruler that does not possess the domestically recognized 
and respected legitimacy, indigenously developed firm and repressive state 
institutionalization, or the majestic regality that were respectively characteristic of Shah 
Ahmad Khan Durrani, Amir Abdur Rahman, and King Mohammad Zahir Shah.  The 
following discussion will be a description of the system of central governance presently 
being established by President Karzai and his administration.  Comparisons will be drawn 
between this system of central governance and those employed by Shah Ahmad Khan 
Durrani, Amir Abdur Rahman, and King Mohammad Zahir Shah in order to determine 
whether or not this system of central governance being developed is radically different 
than systems of central governance that have existed in the past.  This determination will 
then be used to assess the impact that the development of central government in 
Afghanistan plays in considerations for commencing the withdrawal of international 
military troops from Afghanistan in the near future. 
A. ASCENSION TO POWER 
Like Ahmad Khan Durrani, Abdur Rahman, and Mohammad Zahir Shah, Hamid 
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun.  He was the son of a senator that served in the government 
King Mohammad Zahir Shah.  In 1999, Hamid Karzai’s father was assassinated in 
Quetta, Pakistan, by suspected Taliban elements.  After this father’s assassination, Karzai 
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was named the clan chief of the Popalzai-Durrani Pashtuns.  As the chief of the Popalzai-
Durrani Pashtuns, this positioned him for a high–level leadership role in the post–Taliban 
Afghanistan.185  Hamid Karzai did not come to power as the leader of the Afghan nation 
through the traditionally familiar processes that Ahmad Shah Durrani, Abdur Rahman, 
and Mohammad Zahir Shah ascended to the throne. 
1. The Bonn Agreement 
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 created the agenda and process for re-
establishing governance in Afghanistan.  According to Thomas Barfield, the Afghan 
delegates in attendance in Bonn were not looking for an “uberwarlord.”  They wanted 
someone who could deal with the outside world and access resources that would be 
critical to bringing stability to Afghanistan.  None of Afghanistan’s existing faction 
leaders possessed the necessary traits: education, linguistic skills, cultural sophistication, 
and experience in dealing with the outside world.186  However, they well understood that 
the resources of the international community could only be effectively tapped if there was 
a single national figure to deal with the outside world, even if only to cash checks and 
redistribute the money.187  With the assistance of vigorous lobbying by the government 
of the United States, the Afghan and international delegates in Bonn selected Hamid 
Karzai to serve as the head of an interim power-sharing council that would take office on 
December 22, 2001.188  As the head of the Interim Authority, Hamid Karzai would serve 
as the designated leader of the Afghan nation.  According to the Bonn Agreement, an 
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would be responsible for leading Afghanistan until a fully representative government 
could be elected.  In June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga selected Hamid Karzai as the 
President of the Transitional Authority.189 
2. Elections 
The first presidential elections of the Transitional Authority were held in October 
2004.  Hamid Karzai was elected with 55.4 percent of the vote, three times more than any 
other candidate.190  Analysis of the election trends revealed that no presidential candidate 
received significant support outside of their particular ethno-linguistic group.  The 
Afghan ethnic groups tended to vote along ethnic lines rather than cross-over to 
candidates from other ethnicities.  Even though Hamid Karzai possessed the majority of 
the votes, he was not elected with a majority of the vote from any ethnic group outside 
his own dominant Pashtun base.  This analysis therefore concluded that Hamid Karzai did 
not possess support for his presidency across ethnic lines.191   While the Presidential 
election strengthened the legitimacy of Hamid Karzai and his administration in the eyes 
of the international community, it did not have as strong an impact within Afghanistan.192  
The conduct of the Presidential election was more procedural than substantive.193  In 
November 2009, a second Presidential election was conducted.  On November 2, 2009, 
Hamid Karzai elected was once again elected to the Presidency.  However, this election 
was not without its controversy.  Abdullah Abdullah, Hamid Karzai’s opponent for the 
presidency, withdrew from the run-off election claiming that the electoral processes of 
President Hamid Karzai did not facilitate a “fair and transparent” election.194 
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3. Critiques of the Karzai Administration 
Afghans judge the legitimacy of a state by its actions rather than the process that 
created it.195  Even through elections have enabled Hamid Karzai to receive the 
acknowledgement of the international community for his presidency, he has been less 
successful at proving himself as a capable leader of the Afghan people.  Holding 
elections did not compensate for his administration’s failure to meet bedrock benchmarks 
of establishing security and extending government control throughout the country.  In the 
eyes of the Afghan people, President Karzai needed to prove that he could live up to role 
he now filled and provide the people with security, economic improvement, and a 
functioning government.  An electoral victory would mean nothing if he failed to do 
so.196 
President Karzai has also failed to be perceived as independent of foreign control.  
Afghan rulers whose power rested on the protection of foreign troops were naturally 
perceived as suspect.  “The weaker their regimes, the greater the risk of rejection.”197  
Even though President Karzai has managed to set up a state government that is 
increasingly dominated by Durrani Pashtuns, he has been unable to deliver the generous 
subsidies and political favoritism that had flowed to the Pashtun tribe in earlier times.  
The best that President Karzai has been able to do is shield the opium production that 
takes place in traditionally controlled Pashtun regions from outside interference.  
However, in doing so, President Karzai to some degree has alienated his regime from its 
international backers while subsidizing enemies of the Afghan state, in particular the 
Taliban.198   
Widespread complaints of insecurity, governmental misconduct, corruption, and 
abuses of power are steadily reducing domestic confidence in the administration of 
President Hamid Karzai in the absence of any serious steps to curb them.  Even the urban 
residents of Kabul, whose grievances are most likely to be addressed by the central 
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government authority in comparison to those Afghans residing in rural areas, have 
complained that the central government was incapable of meeting such basic needs as 
electricity, drinking water, and transportation.  In the rural territories where most Afghans 
live, there exists is a growing dissatisfaction at the relatively slow pace in the 
improvement of the country’s agricultural economic development, of which they heavily 
rely upon for sustenance. 199 
4. Growing Progress 
The April 2010 governmental report to the U.S. Congress submitted by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense has some indications that governance in Afghanistan is 
moving in a slow, but positive direction.  A national survey conducted by the 
International Assistance Security Forces (ISAF) in March 2010 indicated that 59 percent 
of the Afghan population believes their central government is headed in the “right 
direction.”  This 59 percent was an increase of 0.5 percent in comparison to the survey 
results of December 2009, and an 8 percent increase in comparison to the survey results 
from September 2009.  The March 2010 survey also indicated that 45 percent of the 
Afghan population surveyed reported that they had confidence in the national 
government.  This was a 6 percent increase in comparison to the September 2009 
survey.200  Confidence in the overall performance of the provincial governor was 47 
percent, a 5 percent increase from the survey conducted in the previous quarter.  
Confidence in the overall performance in district governors was 44 percent, a 6 percent 
increase from the survey conducted in the previous quarter. 201    
Despite these general positive trends in surveyed Afghan attitudes towards 
governance, there still exists a predominant negative perception of government 
corruption amongst the population. 202  There is a relatively even split in whether or not 
governmental corruption is more or less prevalent.  The March 2010 survey also 
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indicated that 30 percent of the Afghan population perceived the central government to 
be less corrupt, whereas 24 percent believed that it was more corrupt.  An 
overwhelmingly 83 percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their 
daily lives.  33 percent of those surveyed reported that they perceived their provincial 
governors as corrupt, with 34 percent reporting that they perceived the district governors 
as corrupt. 203  During the January 28, 2010, London Conference, President Karzai 
committed his administration to the institution of reforms aimed at combating 
governmental corruption.204  However, the effects of these reforms are yet to been seen 
and evaluated.  The April 2010 report identified that the political will to prosecute those 
charged with corruption remains a significant obstacle to progress against corruption in 
the country. 205   
B. SUSTAINMENT OF THE REGIME 
Like the regime of Abdur Rahman, the ability of Hamid Karzai to sustain his 
regime against insurgency is linked to the establishment of a robust security force.  At 
present, ISAF is the only military force in country with the manpower and resources to 
hold Taliban militants, who represent the primary military threat to the Karzai Regime, at 
bay.  The ANSF is composed of two primary components, the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). 
1. Afghan National Army (ANA) 
Discussion of the state of the ANA seems largely focused on agreement on end-
strength numbers.  However, simply focusing on this aspect does not provide a complete 
picture of the state of the ANSF.  In August 2009, end-strength goals for the ANA were 
projected to be 134,000 by October 2010.  This number was based upon providing the 
ANA with sufficient numbers on the ground to combat the insurgency.  Training focus 
was placed on building infantry-centric units to assist ISAF forces early on in 
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counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with a plan to rebalance the force in future years 
to enable self-sufficiency.  Recruiting within the ANA has exceeded goals between 
October 2009 and March 2010.   ANA was actually able to recruit more personnel than 
they had the capacity to train.  During the January 2010 London Conference, the 
objective of 171,600 was set.206   
The NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the Combined Security 
Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) have been assisting with developing the 
capacity and quality of the ANSF to eventually take the lead for security in Afghanistan.   
The Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) is the primary training 
institution for the ANA.  The Basic Warrior Course focuses the training of recruits.  The 
ANA Bridmal Academy conducts training and development of ANA non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs).  Officer training is conducted in partnership with international officers 
serving as mentors.  Training is provided at all levels of officer progression, beginning 
with the Basic Officer Training Course, Company Commander’s Course, Command and 
General Staff course, and culminating with the Strategic Command and Staff Course. 207  
A NTM-A/ CSTC-A Medical Training and Advisory Group is working to develop and 
train an ANA medical corps.  The Commando Training Center Garrison is the primary 
ANA institution to train future commando leaders and soldiers through the School of 
Excellence.  The Logistics Directorate and the Logistics Training and Advisory Group, of 
the NTM-A/ CSTC-A, have provided policy development, training, mentoring, 
equipment, and infrastructure to improve ANA logistics capabilities.  107 advisors and 
mentors are embedded in the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and ANA national 
logistics system and assisting them with improving logistics enterprises at both the 
national and operational levels. 
The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) provides another dimension in 
maneuver capability, enhancing freedom of action, battlespace situational awareness, 
intelligence, and air combat support for national military and police forces.  Once 
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organized, trained, and equipped, the ANAAC is envisioned to perform a wide range of 
missions including presidential airlift, aero-medical evacuation and casualty evacuation, 
battlefield mobility, airlift, training, and close air support.  The ANAAC is currently 
comprised of approximately 3,100 personnel and 46 aircraft.  The ANAAC possesses a 
fleet of five AN-32s and one AN-26 fixed-wing propeller-driven aircraft that provides 
medium cargo lift.  In October 2009, the ANAAC acquired its first two U.S.-
manufactured C-27 Spartan fixed-wing, propeller-driven aircraft.  These aircraft will also 
perform the medium airlift mission. 208 
Despite these efforts to build the capability of the ANA, the focus on achieving 
force end-strength numbers is plagued with retention concerns.  Even though the ANA 
has normally been able to achieve and exceed its retention goal of 60 percent over a six-
month period, this has not been the case over the most recent last six months.  Attrition 
(defined as the unplanned loss of ANSF personnel) has been identified as the primary 
cause.  Absent without leave (AWOL) personnel remain a significant contributor to 
attrition rates, with the percentages growing over the past year from six percent in May 
2009 to a high of 12 percent in November 2009.  For the last twelve months, AWOL has 
averaged nine percent.  The NTM-A and the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) has 
instituted pay raises and the initiatives to provide better equipment as a means of 
mitigating further decreases in retention rates.209  Another obstacle is within the ANA 
officer corps where corruption is presently an issue with reports of personnel buying 
positions.  One means that has been instituted to address this issue is the implementation 
of a lottery-based assignment system at the graduation of the cadets at the National 
Military Academy of Afghanistan that will ensure that personnel are randomly assigned 
to all regions of Afghanistan. 210   
Overall, even though the ANA has been able to meet recruiting goals and 
possesses a fairly robust capability building program, the low retention rates and high 
attrition rates are impacting the operational effectiveness of the ANA.  The low retention 
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rates and high attrition rates translate into new personnel continuously cycling into 
operational ANA units.  Less experienced ANA units are tackling ongoing combat 
operations characterized with increasing operational tempos. 211  
2. Afghan National Police (ANP) 
The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and European Police Mission Afghanistan 
(EUPOL) are responsible for operational level reform and development of the ANP.  The 
CSTC-A coordinates with the MoI to select senior MoI officials and ANP officers.  
Presently over 160 CSTC-A military and civilian contractors are involved in the 
mentoring of the ANP.  The ANP is composed of four bodies: the Afghan Civilian 
Police, the Afghan Gendarmerie, the Afghan Border Police, and the Specialized 
Police.212  At present, all for components still require ISAF and international community 
assistance in building a legitimate, respectable, and professional police force. 213   
Even thought the ANP has for the most part been able to meet recruiting 
objectives, the key challenge in building the capacity of the ANP has been training.  The 
multiple international participants involved with building up the capability of the ANP 
are providing multiple and competing inputs from the different participants.  These 
multiple and competing inputs have often resulted in disjointed and confusing approaches 
to police training.214   
Additionally, a “recruit-assign” model has been commonly employed by the MoI 
to meet capacity objectives for the ANP.  60–70 percent of the ANP has been hired and 
deployed with no formal training. 215  For example, to achieve security for the August 
2009 elections, 9,800 personnel were recruited into the ANP.  Due to compressed 
timelines, 6,900 recruits completed only three weeks of the eight-week training program.  
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The remaining 2,900 recruits were placed on duty with no training.  Once the elections 
were complete, a program was then implemented ensure all recruits completed the 
required training program by July 2010. 216   In March 2010, the NTM-A/ CSTC-A has 
coordinated with the MoI to implement a “recruit-train-assign” model in order to ensure 
that all new ANP officers have undergone training before being assigned to official 
policing duties. 217   
A major concern of the international actors providing mentorship and assistance 
to the ANP is the prevailing lack of accountability.  For one, depending on the districts, 
there are accounts of police force member performing policing duties without being paid, 
as well as accounts of “ghost police” that are being paid, but are actually present or 
conducting their duties.  Personnel Asset Inventories have been implemented by the 
coordinated efforts of the MoI and NTM-A/ CSTC-A in order to combat this corruption.  
This process includes managing the registration, drug testing, vetting, weapons 
verification, and biometric data collection of all ANP personnel. 218     
In order to augment the growing, but limited capacity and capability of the ANP, 
an Afghan-led Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) was piloted in the Wardak 
Province in Regional Command East (RC-East) in March 2009.  AP3 is a community-
based security program possessing uniformed members, known as the Afghan Public 
Protection Force (APPF) “Guradians.”  The APPF “Guardians” are an official MoI force 
that reports to the Wardak Provincial ANP Chief of Police.  APPF elements answer to 
local ANP commanders down to the district level.  U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
presently mentors the conduct of the AP3.  There are currently 1,010 trained APPF 
“Guardians.”  Training courses that began in March 2010 are expected to train additional 
APPF “Guardians” in order to achieve the desired force strength of 1,212.  Anecdotal 
evidence has indicated that the AP3 has improved the security situation in the Wardak 
Province and is generally respected by the local population.  However, the U.S. 
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Department of Defense (DoD) at present does not plan to expand the AP3 program due to 
the large amount of resources that are needed to implement the program.219  
C. GOVERNANCE 
In the opinion of this author, the primary means of governance that have been 
instituted by President Karzai and his administration that have the greatest impact on the 
sustainment of the regime are the Afghan Constitution, State Funding, and Taliban 
Reconciliation. 
1. Afghan Constitution 
As the President of the Transitional Authority, Hamid Karzai was required by the 
Bonn Agreement to participate in the development of an Afghan constitution within 18 
months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority.  A Drafting Commission, the 
Constitutional Review Board, and the Constitutional Loya Jirga were formed to create the 
new constitution.  The United Nations, through the United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) provided assistance.  The final version of the draft constitution 
was deliberated and adopted by the 502 member Constitutional Loya Jirga from 13 
December 2003 to 4 January 2004. 220      
The constitution established a strong executive, a bicameral legislature, and a 
state judicial system.  The president was designated as both Head of State and the Head 
of the Government.  The president would be elected by a majority of the popular vote and 
would be eligible to serve two five-year terms.  The bicameral legislature, which largely 
resembles in structure the legislature of Abdur Rahman and Mohammad Zahir Shah, was 
composed of a Wolesi Jirga (Lower House or House of the People) that would 
promulgate laws, ratify treaties, and approve budgets.  The Meshrano Jirga (Upper 
House or House of Elders) possessed the authority to approve proposed laws and the 
budget.  The Meshrano Jirga was composed of both elected and appointed members.  As 
a means of checks and balances, the constitution provided the bicameral legislature with 
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the authority to impeach the president.  The state judicial system was composed of a 
Supreme Court, along with High Courts and Appeals Courts.  Even though the 
constitution did not formally establish religious courts, powerful Islamists are possessing 
growing influence in the emerging Afghan judiciary. 221  
2. State Funding 
Similar to the regimes of the Ahmad Khan Durrani and Abdur Rahman, the 
majority of the revenues used to fund the operations of the state are received in the form 
of foreign subsidies and contributions.  Since the GIROA is unable to implement policies 
and reforms to foster substantial domestic economic development in order to generate 
revenues for the state, the state must rely on revenues received through a combination of 
donations and aid from both international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.  One area that the GIROA has been able to raise substantial revenues 
domestically is from customs.   Customs taxes provide 39% of revenue to the GIROA. 
Some examples of revenues for the state provided to the GIROA from the international 
community include the U.S. Department of Treasury and the United States Agency for 
International Development’s (USAID) Economic Governance and Private Sector 
Program.  This program provided $70 million in assistance to the GIROA over four years 
and ended in August 2009.  The Economic Growth and Governance Initiative will take 
over where the Economic Governance and Private Sector Program left off and will 
provide up to a maximum of $93 million over the next five years beginning in August 
2009.  The Trade Access and Facilitation in Afghanistan project will provide $63 million 
over a five-year period.  The World Bank’s International Development Association and 
the International Monetary Fund, under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative, 
provided the GIROA with $1.6 million in debt relief based on the country’s progress in 
implementing reforms in public finance management, the mining sector, and health and 
education service’s transparency and accountability.222  President Karzai has disclosed in 
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public statements to the media that several countries have given money to his office.  One 
example provided was the $1.5 million provide by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nine 
years ago during the formation of Afghanistan’s Interim Government.223  More recently, 
the media has reported that the government of Iran provided monetary assistance to the 
GIROA.  President Karzai has publically disclosed that once or twice a year, Iran has 
provided his office anywhere from $700,000 to $975,000 for official presidential 
expenses. 224 
In addition to mentoring, the government of the United States is assisting the 
formation and development of the ANSF through monetary assistance.  The Secretary of 
Defense is provided with Title 10 funding through the National Defense Appropriations 
Act to man, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF through the Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund (ASFF).  Congress appropriated $6.6 billion in FY 2010 for ASFF.  In February 
2010, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) submitted the FY 2010 ASFF 
Supplemental request of $2.6 billion and the FY 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations 
ASFF request of $11.6 billion.  For the ANA, the ASFF provides funding for the 
manning, training, equipping, and fielding of 72 infantry battalions, 12 special operations 
forces (SOF) battalions (commandos and security forces), 13 combat support battalions 
(reconnaissance, artillery, and engineering) and 21 combat service support battalions 
(logistics).  For the ANP, ASFF provides funding for support to existing police forces in 
addition to ANP growth to 96,800.  The ASFF also provides funding for infrastructure 
required to field two Afghan Gendarmerie battalions, a MoI National Logistics Center, 
and a MoI transportation battalion.225  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
has established an ANA Trust Fund that receives monetary contributions from several 
international partners in amounts totaling $155 million.  The United Nations 
Development Program overseas the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOTF-A). 
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LOFT-A provides funding for salaries and other ANP development programs.  From 
2002 to 2009, approximately $625 million was donated to LOTF-A from the international 
community. 226 
3. Taliban Reconciliation 
One means by which President Karzai is attempting to bolster support for his 
regime from powerful tribal groups within Afghanistan is through the reconciliation and 
reintegration of former Taliban into Afghan society.  President Karzai has formed a 
seventy member council to try to reconcile with the Taliban and find a political solution 
to the insurgency.  Even though Taliban hardliner top leadership has denied that any of 
their representatives have been involved in reconciliation and reintegration discussion 
with the GIROA, there are reports from U.S. representative in Afghanistan indicating that 
individuals who have fought alongside the Taliban—apparently not necessarily Taliban 
leaders themselves—have been reaching out.227  Even though the Afghan people are 
weary after nine years of war, there exists strong opposition to the GIROA pursuit to 
reconcile and reintegrate former Taliban.  This opposition is primarily from ethnic 
minorities and women's groups who are concerned that negotiations will open a path for 
the Taliban to regain power or “exact painful concessions.”228  The efforts and 
effectiveness of this program have yet to be seen and evaluated. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Central governance development in Afghanistan continues to progress.  The 
challenges facing President Hamid Karzai are similar to those that were faced and dealt 
with by Shah Ahmad Khan Durrani, Amir Abdur Rahman, and King Mohammad Zahir 
Shah.  The common similarity between all four of these regimes is that their efforts are 
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primarily focused on the sustainment of the central authority as opposed to the 
administration of governance to the Afghan people.  One can argue that the 
administration of governance cannot occur without the establishment and sustainment of 
the central authority.  During the reign of Ahmad Khan Durrani, the sustainment of the 
regime was heavily reliant upon the cooperative relationship between the monarchy and 
the state.  Even though Ahmad Khan Durrani focused efforts to bolster the strength of the 
monarchy in comparison to the strength of the tribes by building an army that was loyal 
to the monarchy, he was not quite able to completely sever his dependence on them to 
sustain his regime.  It was not until the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman that the monarchy 
was for a large part able to sever its reliance on the monetary and manpower support of 
the tribes.  This was accomplished primarily through accepting British foreign subsides 
and arms.  Even though Abdur Rahman was able to sever the monarchy’s reliance on the 
tribes in that particular aspect, he did still seek to include tribal leaders in the 
administration of governance, but only in a limited capacity.  Still, Abdur Rahman was so 
successful in suppressing opposition to the Kabul government that his successors 
remained unchallenged for more than a generation.229  It was not until the reign of King 
Mohammad Zahir Shah that the focus of central government had shifted from merely the 
sustainment of the regime to the administration of governance aimed at including the 
Afghan people in state level politics.  This was largely due to the Musahiban regime 
making the sustainment of internal stability the priority of the central government in 
addition to efforts to slowly incorporate aspects of foreign influence in Afghan society.  It 
has taken over 220 years, from the reign of Shah Ahmad Khan Durrrani to the reign of 
King Mohammad Zahir Shah, for central governance in Afghanistan to achieve a state of 
existence that has been described as “springtime of peace and gentility,” a figurative  
“golden age.” 230,  231  
President Karzai has pursued the sustainment of his regime through his 
cooperation with the international actors, particularly the United States.  The majority of 
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the central government development that has taken place during the reign of the Karzai 
administration has largely been to obtain the continued international support for his 
regime.  So far, almost all processes of nation-building and central government 
development that have taken place during Hamid Karzai’s presidency have been carried 
out with international support.  Even though this cooperation sustains the regime, it is 
negatively impacting President Karzai’s domestic reputation and support since his 
cooperation is characterizing him as a “puppet” of the international community, not a 
strong Afghan leader that is capable of unifying the nation of Afghanistan under his rule.   
The bottom line here is that the despite all the blood and treasure that has been 
sacrificed and committed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the affairs of the state remain 
messy.  Throughout the history of Afghanistan, the central government authority has not 
been able to sustain its rule without the assistance of foreign interests.  Even Abdur 
Rahman, who was a strong advocator of Afghan isolationism, could not develop his 
system of central governance without the assistance of the British.  Cooperation and 
stability, regardless of the means by which it was attained, was the priority of the central 
government authority.  A strong, representative, central government has never been 
characteristic of the nation of Afghanistan.  Even though this altruistic objective of the 
international community is a noble goal, it is not necessarily a requirement for continued 
international military presence in Afghanistan.  Substantial, and indeed historical, 
achievements have taken place since the fall of the Taliban.232  Cooperation with the 
United States and the international community has brought major improvements to 
Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of education and health care.  Creating a strong, 
representative, central government that can build and sustain a functioning economy and 
infrastructure in Afghanistan is an endeavor that will take years, if not decades for the 
people of Afghanistan to achieve.233 
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